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I. INTRODUCTION
In reality, the origin of a human person is the result of an act of giving.
The one conceived must be the fi-uit of his parents' love. He c m o t be
desired or conceived as the product of an intervention of medical or
biological techniques; that would be equivalent to reducing him to m
object of scientific technology. No one may subject the coming of a child
into the world to conditions of technical efficiency which are to be
evaluated according to the standards of control and dominion.'
[B]y the action of Modem Industry, all family ties among the proletarians
are tom asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of
commerce. . . 2
After much searching, the couple finally found an egg which contained the precise
genetic characteristics that they were looking for. They paid their money to the clerk at
the register and took their egg in search of some sperm to fertilize it. No ordinary sperm
would do, this couple was willing to pay any price for the genetically prime sperm to
create their perfect child. After some searching, they found the sperm they were looking
for. The eager "parents-to-be" paid their money and took all of the ingredients for their
future "bundle ofjoy" to the lab for fertilization. After a little mixing it was time to
implant the newly fertilized egg into a specially chosen "gestator" who would deliver the
product in nine months. But nine months is an awful long time to wait for such a busy
couple, so after six months it was time to cancel delivery and just call the whole thing off.
Such a "supermarket analysis" of the conception and birth of a human being
seems appalling because it treats the creation of a human being with little more dignity
than the purchase of a piece of furniture, but in many states sophisticated medical
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technology coupled with a lack of statutory guidance regarding surrogacy arrangements
has made just this sort of situation possible.) This Paper analyzes the problems created
by the enforcement of surrogacy contracts and proposes legislation by which the State of
New Mexico can proactively protect its children and parents from the social and legal
dangers of surrogacy contracts.
First, this Paper will explore three of the most compelling policy reasons for
voiding surrogacy contracts: (1) the societal consequences of allowing the redistribution
of procreation through contract; (2) "n~atemal"argun~ents~
for the protection of the hired
surrogate; and (3) current policies which are embedded in New Mexico Statutes. Second,
this Paper will analyze other state statues which have voided surrogacy contracts.
Finally, based on the earlier analysis of policy and state laws, this Paper recommends a
statute which should be adopted in New Mexico. 'The proposed statute will then be
analyzed to see how it would be applied.
11. POLICY REASONS FOR VOIDING SURROGACY CONTRACTS

A. The societal consequences of allowing the redistribution
of procreation through contract.
Most issues in contract law hold great weight for the individual litigants but little
lasting impact for the society at large and even less of an impact upon future generations.
However, the use of contract as a vehicle for reordering or redistributing procreative
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resources creates an interplay between the commercial realm and the fundamental facets
of what we are as individuals and a society.' Because this issue touches on the almost
unimaginable breadth of what it is to be a human being, it is difficult to concisely address
this issue. However, I will touch upon two fundamental concerns which t.he enforcement
of surrogacy contracts raises in New Mexico. First, is society's duty to protect human
dignity and equality by forbidding the commodification of h m a n beings. Second, is the
related concern that surrogacy contracts are illegal because they violate the Thirteenth
~ r n e n d m e n since
t ~ they market in human beings.
From the founding days of our nation we have recognized a duty to protect the
dignity and equality of human life.' Over time we have sought to expand thcsc
protections when we have recognized that current protections were l a c k i ~ ~ Included
g.~
within the state protection of the dignity of human lire are prohibitions which proscribe
contractual alienation of goods and services which offend the basic dignities which our
society embraces. For example, prohibitions on the alienation oE; human flesh for
consumption, human organs for profit, and the commercial alienation of sex are widely
accepted as necessary for the protection of human dig nit^.^
1. The Commodification of Children as an Offense to Human Dignity.

See William J . Wagner, The Contruc~ualReallocalion of Procrealive Resources and Purcn~ulRighls: rhc
Natural Endowmen1 Cri~iqzre,4 1 CASEW. RES. L.REV. 1, 7 ( 1990).
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See e.g. U.S. CONST.amend. Xlll (invalidating slavery); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483

(1954) (abolishing segregation in public schools); and U.S. CONST.amend. XIX (extending tlie right to
vote to women).
See Wagner, supra note 5, at 184.

Allowing resources to be exchanged through contract requires that they be
comrn~dified.'~
The contractual reallocation of procreation through s m g a c y results in
the commodification of both children and women. Treating women and children as
objects which can be bought, sold, and rented is an affront to the principals of human
dignity and equality which we strive for as a comniunity.
The design of the vast majority of surrogacy contracts demonstrate the
commodification of children through surrogacy. In most surrogacy contracts the
surrogate is paid nothing if she miscarries the child prior to the fifth month of pregnancy,
$1000 if she carries the child beyond the fifth month but the pregnancy results in a stillbirth, and $10,000 if she gives birth to a live child at full term." These arrangements
clearly indicate that it is the child, not the egg or gestation that is being paid for.I2 While
such conditions could be outlawed, their current existence demonstrates the underlying
commodification which would not end with a change of contractual terms.
The manner of child selection further indicates the comlnodification of children
born (or aborted) through surrogacy contracts. For example, when the prospective
parents need to obtain sperm, ova, or both from a donor they can go to a sperm or ovum
bank and review the personal characteristics of the donor such as the height, weight,
educational achievements (as a indication of IQ), eye color, race, physical attractiveness,

as well as a myriad of other characteristic^.'^ This practice is often defended on the
grounds that the purchasers should be able to find a child which has characteristics

Id. at 168- 170.
See M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, Wha! Money Cannot Buy: Commerciul Surrogucy and
the Doctrine oJlllegal Con~racts,32 ST. LorJIs U. L. J. 1 17 I , 1202 (1988); see ulso, Ragone, infra note 59,
at 141-53.
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similar to their own.14 However, the reality is that purchasers choose children with
'good' characteristics rather than short, fat, ugly, children with low IQs even if these
characteristics which match their own." This search for the 'good' in a child results in
the commodification of the child himself m d misses the point that all children are 'good'
and deserving of dignity.16
A final demonstration of the commodification of the children througl~surrogacy
and the use of surrogacy contracts is the fact that the parent's rights to have a child
through this method is directly based on the parents willingness and ability to pay for the
child." As one commentator stated: "[Aldoptive parents can tell their child, 'your mother
loved you so much she gave you up. even though it made her sad because that was best
for you."' but the contract father can only say; ''Your mother gave you up in order to earn

$1 0,000."'~ While the contractual parents may not tell their children this, the studies have
shown that economics is the primary motivation for womcn who decide to bear a child as
a surrogate, so the underlying commodification remains the same.19
Women are commodified through the surrogate process as well. In a 'traditional'
surrogacy context where the surrogate mother's own egg is impregnated by the donor
father, the surrogate is commodified in two very important ways. First, much like the
child, she is sought after as one who can provide the 'good' child in terms of race, IQ,
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health, athletic ability, height, weight, etc. with 'better' surrogates in greater demand.x

Ln addition, in this type of surrogacy agreement although the surrogate and the sperm
donor each contribute one-half of the genes to the child and the surrogate carries the child
for nine months, upon birth the sperm donor becomes the natural father while the
surrogate remains just that, a surrogate.*'
In the context of the commodification of both the women and children involved in
surrogacy agreements there is really no similarity to adoption because unlike adoption the
mother in a surrogacy agreement brings a child into the world only in response to the
contracting parent's payment and d e n ~ a . n d This
. ~ ~ contracting for human beings is
unacceptable because "[tlhere are in a civilized society, some things that money cannot
buy."23 Long ago, this nation fought The Civil War in order to establish that human
beings are one of the things that money cannot by
2. Surrogacy Contracts Violate the Dignity and Equality
Guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America
proclaims that "[nleither slavery nor involuntary servitude, . . . shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their juri~diction."~~
Shamefully, New Mexico had
a part in the development of the jurisprudence of the Thirteenth Amendment. A
widespread practice in New Mexico called "peonageV(which began under Mexican rule

" S e e Yvonne M . Warlen, Comment, The Renling o11he Womb: An Analysis o ~ G c . r ~ u ~ i oSurrogucy
nal
Conrracrs Under A41ssouri Conrrac~Law, 62 U. MO. KAN. CITYL. REV 583, 589 ( 1 994).
See Randin, supra note 13, at 1932.
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l 2 See Randin, supra note 13, at 1928-1929.
"See I n Re Baby M , 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988).
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and continued after New Mexico became a territory and the Thirteenth Amendment was
ratified) led to 42 U.S.C. $1994 and 18 U.S.C.$1581.'~
Peonage was a practice not unlike the modem surrogacy agreement^.'^ Under
peonage contracts, like modem surrogate contracts, a free person27entered into a contract
for personal services for which he or she was paid in advance.28 Once this contract had
been entered into, the service contract became specifically enforceable against the peon.2Y
Under this system of labor, the rich landowners in New Mexico bound a large class of
peons.30 If a peon attempted to renege on his or her contract, the master "pursued,
reclaimed, and reduced him to obedience and labor again; and the alcaldesa' . . . aided the
master in bringing back his h~gitive."'~
Accordingly, New Mexico lent the weight of its government (under both Mexican
and American rule) to the enforcement of personal labor contracts in the past.33 Idowever,
this practice was outlawed by the peonage acts" in 1867. Some consider this practicc to
be even more dangerous than ~ l a v e r y . ~While
'
slavery is an institution which we (at least
now) recognize as being blatantly in violation of human rights for a host of reasons,
peonage is an institution which is much more invidious because the peons arc encouraged

The Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707 (E.D. Ark., 1905).
See Cyril C. Means, Jr., Surrogacy v The Thirleenrh Amendmen!, 4 N.Y.L. SCII.HUM. RTS. A N N . 445,
458 (1 987).
27 See Mariana Jarernillo v. Jose De La Cruz Romero, 1 N.M. 190, 199 (1 857) (stating that "[a]11 rree rncn
and women . . . may celebrate this species of contract.")
28 Id, at 194.
l9 Id. at 205.
lo Id. at 194.
" Alcaldes were the modem equivalent of a colnrnurl~lymagistrate judge. See Jarernillo, supra note 27, at
199.
Jarernillo, supra note 27, at 194.
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See 42 U.S. C. $1994 (1867).
The Peonage Cases, supra note 25, at 708
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(by poverty or greed) to enter into contracts which grant control of their lives to men of
great wealth and power.36 The modern debate over the enforceability of surrogate
contracts highlights the invidious nature of peonage arrangements.
The use of the bodies of poor women in order to provide a maternal service for
richer women is not unknown in the history of our country. Black women coimlonly
served as 'wet nurses' to white children during slavery so that the white women could
"preserve the shape of their breasts."j7 The surrogate contract tluough which women
grant the use of their bodies to another for a fee mimics the classic peonage arrangement
"by which one person lets or grants to another person the service of [her] person . . . for a
certain time."38
Such contracts are void as violative of the peonage act regardless of whether the
"laborer entered into that contract voluntarily and with full knowledge of the conditions
of [her] employment".39 ~ c c o r d i n g l ~
New
, Mexico should make a clear break from its
shameful past, when women and children were sold into peonage, by legislatively
refusing to enforce this modern day peonage.

B. "Maternal" arguments that the surrogate
must be afforded protection by the law.

I h Id. Cf:LEGISLATIVE
COMMISSION
ON SCIENCE
A N D T E C I - 1 ~ 0 1 .CONTRACT
0~~:
MO'THEIIIIOOD,
ETIIICAI.
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prohibits the payment of money for any organ removed from an individual so as to prevent a markct in
organs from forming. The intent of such a policy is to preclude a situation where those with few financial
resources could be put under duress. This is our public policy despite the fact that the availability of an
organ may mean the difference between life and death for those in need.")
" See Lorraine Stone, Neoslavery - "Surrogafe" Mo~herhoodCon~rucfsv. The Thir~eenfh
Amendmen/, 6
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Most discussion on this issue has focused on the rights and obligations of the
"parents" who contract for the child to be born. This approach seems to further
commodify the surrogate mother as one who is providing a service which has been paid
for by the contracting couple.40 However, some have taken a "maternalistic" approach to
this discussion which addresses the topic of surrogacy with a dominant concern for the
rights and obligations of the women who become s~rrogates.~'
Three major concerns have been raised from the perspective of the surrogates.
First, the surrogate mother cannot truly give informed consent at the time she enters into
the contract.42Second, the surrogate and her family bear extraordinary psychological
consequences resulting from the pregnancy and childbirth which cannot be compensated
for through the contract.43 Finally, the surrogate mother bears a substantial biological tie
to the child even when she is not biologically related to it.44
1. Lack of Informed Consent.

New Mexico law requires that the parties entering into medical contracts must
give informed consent to the procedure."s Informed consent means that the patient is
educated as to all of the pertinent facts concerning the medical procedure prior to giving
consent.46 In response to this desire that informed consent be given in surrogacy
procedures, several states have passed legislation which allows for surrogacy contracts
but requires judicial intervention prior to the inception of the surrogacy arrangement in
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order to ensure that the surrogate is fully infornled regarding the course which she is to
~ndertake.~'
However, regardless of judicial intervention, surrogate mothers are incapable of
giving truly infornled consent for two reasons. First. the motivations of the surrogate
mother combined with her inequitable bargaining position in relation to the contracting
couple undermines her ability to understand the pertinent facts necessary for making an
informed d e ~ i s i o n . ' Second,
~
the surrogate cannot accurately predict the intervening
factors which may occur over the next nine months that could undermine her original
consent.j9
The few studies which have been done in this area have uncovered three primary
factors which seem to motivate women to become surrogate mothers.

The first is that

the women indicate that they enjoy being pregnant because it enhances thcir feelings of
attractiveness and femininit~.~'
This factor in and of itself is problematic because it
implies that at the time she enters into the contract, the potential surrogate is considering
the pregnancy itself rather than giving up the child.
A second common reason for entering into surrogacy agreements seems to be a

desire on the part of the surrogate to work through issues surrounding her previous loss of
a child through either abortion or a d ~ p t i o n . ' ~Again, this reason for entering into such a
weighty agreement seems to be suspect because a person who tries to work through issues

46
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'"Id. at 408-4 10.
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created by giving up a child previously by agreeing to give one up again may be setting
herself up for failure.
The third key factor that seems to motivate surrogate mothers in their decision to
enter into surrogacy agreements is e c o n o n ~ i c s .Indeed,
~~
some studies indicate that this is
usually the primary motivation for bearing a child for another through s~rrogacy.~'
The
economic motive has led many family law scholars and feminists to condemn surrogacy
agreements because of the danger that surrogates will be drawn from historically
exploited classes of people and a concern that such a system commodifies both the
surrogates and their ~hildren.'~
The combination of these motivational factors seem to put the surrogate into a
very vulnerable position from the starts6 The inequitable position of the surrogate is
further intensified by the fact that most surrogates come into contact with the contracting
couple through the intercession of a middleman who is seeking to ensure a proper match
and a successfully completed ~ontract.'~His desire to insure that the contract is
successfully completed clearly puts the middlemen on the side of the contracting couple
by ensuring that he works toward the relinquishment of the child rather than the best
interests of the surrogate.
The inequity of bargaining power between the proposed surrogate and the
contracting parents is further illustrated in the extremely intrusive naturc of the surrogate
contract itself. First and foremost, the surrogate agrees to "rent" her body to another for a

Id at 399-400.
Id
'4 See Warlen, .supra note 19, at 589
"See Brinig, szrpra note 4, at 2380.
"
53

period of nine months.58 Prior to entering the contract, the surrogate must normally
undergo both psychological and physical exan~inationsto ensure that she is acceptable to
the contracting parents for the task at

She must contract not to have any sexual

intercourse during a prescribed time." She must agree not to consume alcohol or smoke
during the pregnancy." Finally, the surrogate contracts that she will not abort the child of
her own will but she will abort the child if the contractual parents so desire.62
The central theme of most surrogacy contracts surrounds the agreement that once
the child has been delivered, the surrogate will relinquish all rights to the child in favor s f
the contracting "parents".63 This situation requires that the surrogate contractually bind
herself to a course of action which she must perform in nine months. This is
inappropriate because the surrogate cannot have gauged precisely what the effects of
pregnancy and child-birth will be frorn her ex ante position.6"
This commitment to a course of action which is lo culminate in nine ~nonths
ignores the fact that much will change in and around the surrogate in the course of the
next nine months. Indeed, the intent of the contract revolves around the notion that much
will change. Strong emotional bonding between a woman and the child within her womb

'"d. at 2386.
Id. at 2393-2394.
See Warlen, supra note 19, at 583-584.
" See HELENA RAGONE, SURROGATE
MOTI-IERHOOD
143- 144 (! 994).
* I d at 144.
Id. at 145.
Id Although the contracts themselves often recognize that these provisions are Constitutionally infirm,

''
"

they are still included. This action demonstrates the coercive nature of the contract, in that it p~rrposely
includes terms which the drafters wish to enforce although they know that these terms are illegal.
'' Id. at 14 1 - 153; see ulso Stephen G. York, A Con~ruc~uul
Ana1y.ri.s of Surrogale Motherhood and a
Proposed Solu~ion,24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 397 ( 1 99 1 ).
6" ,Tee Brinig, supra note 4, at 2388.

occurs even within women who do not intend to keep their ~ h i l d . ~This
'
bonding
indicates that even mothers who enter a pregnancy with the intent of relinquishing the
child cannot be fully informed of the emotional consequences of their decision at the
outset.66
2. Psychological Effects on the Surrogate and Iler Family.
The surrogate and her family bear a psychological toll fiom the pregnancy and
relinquishment of the child which cannot be compensated within the c ~ n t r a c t . ~The
'
potentially grave nature of these effects cautions against enforcement of the agreement
which may result in psychological harm not only to the surrogate but to her children as

Many surrogacy agreements require that the surrogate has previously given birth
to at least one

Indeed research indicates that many surrogates already have

~hildren.~'However, despite their inevitable involvement in the pregnancy of their
mother, the surrogate's children in this situation are third parties who are not a part of the
main action." It is appropriate to evaluate this type of situation from a family law
perspective, placing the surrogate's children first despite parental attempts to put their
own interests first.72

--
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Often a surrogate, who already has children of her own, decides to bear a child for
another couple out of a desire for money or even out of an altruistic desire to give a child
to another fa~nily.'~Current debate and scholarship in this area has focused on the wants
and needs of the adults. However, this debate has not addressed the potential impact on
the surrogate's children who may be left asking: Will mommy give me away if she needs
money or decides that another couple needs me more than her?" There appears to be no
research regarding the psychological consequences of surrogacy on the surrogate's
children. Rather than encouraging the continuation of a potentially harmful practice, this
lack of knowledge should counsel for extreme caution when analyzing surrogacy
arrangements.

3. Physiological Connection Between the Surrogate and the Child.
Most of the literature surrounding surrogacy has considered the surrogate mother
to be little more than a "breeder"7s who provides a womb for the growl11 and dcveloplnent
of a child who is genetically and biologically only related to the woman who donated the
ovum. However, despite this attitude by legal scholars and courts, the Ethics Committee
of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists stands by the principle that
gestation determines motherhood regardless of genetics.76
In his highly technical article detailing the profound impacts which the gestational
mother's endocrine system has on the developing child, R. Brian Oxman argued that :
"there is no organ system of the fetus that is not anatomically, psychologically, and

See York, supra note 63, at 399,400.
2384.
75 See Warlen, supra note 19, at 583, 584.
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genetically affected by a gestational mother's endocrine system, and therefore, the
resulting child is uniquely a product of the gestational mother regardless of who
contributed genetic material to the child.'"' Ignoring the contribution of the surrogate
mother results is not only scientifically u n s o ~ n d ' ~it,reinforces the subjugatio~lof the
surrogate mother to the more powerful interests of those who have hired her to carry a
child for them. While there is also an obvious biological connection between the child
and the donor of the ovum, there is no sound basis for upholding a surrogacy contract on
the grounds that the surrogate is not the genetic contributor of the ovum.
C. Surrogacy Contracts Are Void Because They Violate
Current New Mexico Statutes.

The enforcement of surrogacy contracts would violate several New Mexico
statutes in either letter or policy. Among these are: (1) statutes which prohibit the transfer
of parental rights for a fee; (2) statutes which establish the parentage of children; and (3)
statutory provisions which outline the necessary procedures for the termination of
parental rights.
Although these statutes can apply to void surrogacy contracts, they are not
designed to do so. However, they demonstrate that this state embraces ideals of human
rights which are contrary to such contracts. Despite these ideals, without legislative
action in this area, surrogacy contracts will continue to violate the human rights which
this state espouses. To emphasize the need for legislative action in this arca I will

76 See R . Brian Oxrnan, Maternal-Feral Re1ationsh1p.sund Nongenetic Surro,qarc~,33 JUIIIM. J . 387, 396
( 1993).
77

Id. at 389.

'' Id. at 393.

analyze each of these statutes in order to demonstrate the underlying policies and the
inadequacies in surrogacy situations.
1. Statutes which prohibit the transfer of parental rights for a fee.

Under the New Mexico Children's Code79the legislature specifically outlined the
types of permissible payments in the context of adoption.s0 First, the statute only allows
the payment of certain expenses to third party

vendor^.^' Second, although the statute

does allow payment for such items as medical expensess2 and living expenses,83it
specifically states that "[nlothing in this section shall be construed to permit payment to a
woman for conceiving and carrying a

The code provides that a party responsible

for making statutorily unauthorized payments is guilty of a full niisden~eanor.~~
Surrogacy agreements by their very nature contemplate a contract in which a
woman is paid for conceiving and carrying a child. On its face, a surrogacy contract is
apparently not only void as violative of the New Mexico Children's Code, but may also
expose the contracting parties to criminal liability.86 Although this analysis lends support
to the notion that surrogacy contracts are void under New Mexico law, it may be difficult
to prosecute those who enter into surrogacy agreements for violation of the Children's
Code for two reasons.

''N.M. STAT. ANN. $32A
*'N.M. STAT. ANN.
Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN.
" N . M . STAT. A m .
84 N.M. STAT. ANN.
''N.M. STAT. ANN.
36 Id.

'*

$32A-5-34B.
$32A-5-34B(2).
432A-5-34B(4).
f~32A-5-34F.
432A-5-34C; N.M. STAT. ANN. 332A-5-42A.

First, there is currently no caselaw interpreting the scope of N.M. Stat. Ann.
$32~-5-34'' or N.M. Stat. Ann. $32~-5-42.'' A second, and related, concern is that
because the statute does not specifically address paid surrogacy arrangements, the rule of
lenitys9may be implicated, requiring that the statute be interpreted in the defendant's
f a v ~ r Despite
.~
the unlikely application of criminal sanctions under New Mexico's
adoption statutes these statutes could be used by the courts to invalidate sLurogacy
contracts." Accordingly, this ambiguity in the law beckons for legislative action to make
it clear that the same policies which caution against "the payment to a woman for
conceiving and carrying a

in an adoption context logically apply in the context of

surrogacy as well.
2. New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act.
The New Mexico Uniform Parentage k t 9 ' prescribes the methods by which the
parentage of children will be established. Under this act the default presumption with
respect to motherhood is that the woman who gave birth to the child is the natural
mother.94 The statute allows for an "interested party"95to challenge maternity,96however,
a contracting mother attempting to challenge the maternity of the birth mother (surrogate)
would have a difficult time since the act provides for only one default position with

" Which

prohibits payment for conceiving or carrying a child.
Which provides penalties for a violation of the payment provisions of N.M.STAT. A N N . 432A-5-34.
" See State v. Anaya, 123 N.M.14,23 ( 1 996).
Id. at 24. ("the existence of any ambiguity at to [the statute's] intended scope requires . . . that [they] be
interpreted in the defendant's favor.")
''See ln re Baby M , supra note 23 (in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a surrogacy conlract
was void on public policy grounds because it violated New Jersey's child trafficking stalutes.)
"'N.M. STAT.ANN. $32A-5-34F.
"N.M. STAT. ANN. $540-1 1-1 1040-1 1-23.
N.M. STAT. ANN. $40- 1 1-4.
"'N.M.STAT.A N N . $40-1 1-21.
96 Id.

respect to motherhood, the woman who gave birth.97 Additionally, the state" jurisdiction
statutegslimits the court's authority in a maternity claim to those individuals who had
sexual intercourse in the state with respect to children who may have been conceived as a
result of that intercourse. Because the surrogate was not impregnated as a result of
intercourse, the New Mexico courts probably lack jurisdiction over her with respect to a
challenge to her maternity.
The parental status of the surrogate's husband may be more difficult to establish.
Under the statute which provides for presumptions of paternity, the husband of the
surrogate would be presumed to be the father of the child so long he and the natural
mother were married to each other at the time the child was bon~.~%owever,the
paternity issue is somewhat confused by the statute defining paternity in cases sf artificial
i n s e m i n a t i ~ n . 'Under
~ ~ this statute, "the husband is treated as if he were the natural
father" if his written consent to the insemination is filed with the vital statistics bureau.'"
In contrast, the statute provides only that the donor of the semen "may be treated as if he
were the natural father" if he has filed a written consent.Io2 Again, it seems that the
husband of the birth mother is given priority sir~cehe "is" treated as the father while the
donor of the sperm "may be" treated as such.
The issue of paternity is more clear however in a situation like that in the
Buzzanca case,I0' where the contracting man was not the donor of the sperm. The
-

Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. 540- 1 1-8.
"N.M. STAT.ANN. $40- 1 1 -5A(I).
IM N.M. STAT.
AhW. $40-1 1-6.
''I N.M. STAT. ANN. $40- 1 1 -6A (emphasis added).
I o 2 N.M. STAT.ANN. $40- 1 I -6B (emphasis added).
'" See B u m n c a v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rpt.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
97
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contracting man who has not donated sperm would not even gain the benefit of the
artificial insemination statute in New Mexico. Accordingly, the enforcement of a
surrogacy contract to determine parentage in New Mexico would violate the very statute
which, by its terms, is designed to determine issues of parentage in this state. However,
the lack of clarity in the parentage statutes beckons for legislative action.
3. Statutory Provisions which Outline the Procedures
for the Termination of Parental Wights.

New Mexico provides statutory guidance for the termination of parental rights in
two contexts. First, parental rights may be terminated if there has been a finding of child
abuse or neglect.'04 Second, the parental rights of an individual may be terminated as a
part of an adoption proceeding.'0s However, the termination of parental rights attempted
by the surrogacy contracts does not begin to meet the stringent requirements for
termination under the New Mexico statutes in either context.
Because the termination of parental rights is such an extraordinary action with
severe consequences, the courts in New Mexico have required that the requirements of
the termination statutes be strictly followed.'06 Under both the adoption and the child
abuselneglect statutes a court must determine the factual grounds for termination by clear
and convincing evidence.'''

The purported termination of parental rights in a surrogacy

agreement fails to address the statutory requirements of a judicial hearing. Therefore, any

Iw
lo'

N.M.STAT. ANN. 532A-4-29.
N.M.
STAT.A m . 932A-5-15.

'M In re Adoption of Doe, 101 N.M. 34, 38 (Ct. App. 1984). See ul.ro Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (holding that parents have a liberty interest in
having a full and fair hearing before the termination sf their parental rights).
'07 N.M. STAT.ANN. 532A-5-16H; and N.M. STA.I.
ANN.$32A-4-29J.

termination of parental rights by surrogacy contract violates the provisions of the statutes
which govern such an action and is ineffective under New Mexico law.
4. Statutory Provisions which Provide Guidance on the Placement
of Children with Individuals Other Than Their Natural Parents.

Under New Mexico law there are several situations (such as divorce, adoption,
and neglect) in which the courts are called upon to determine the placement of a child
outside of the traditional family which most children are born into.IoYHowever, none of
these situations ask the courts to look to contractual agreements which have sought to
establish placement of a child. Rather, the statutes and the court decisions in this area
require the courts to look to the "best interests of the child" in determining where the
child should be placed.109Placing a child in a home without regard to the best interests of
that child when the custody andlor parentage is challenged ignores one of the most basic
protections which the state gives to its most vulnerable members. In order to protect the
children of surrogacy, New Mexico must adopt legislation which provides them with the
same basic protections which it provides to other children.
111. ANALYSIS OF STATE STATUTES WHICH HAVE

VOIDED SURROGACY CONTRACTS.
If New Mexico chooses to adopt a law to void surrogacy contracts as a matter of
public policy it is likely to look to other states that have enacted similar legislation. 'ren
states plus the District of Columbia currently have laws voiding surrogacy statutes."' In

IohSee N.M.
STAT.ANN. $40-4-9A; N.M. STAT. A N N . $40-4-9.I A & B; see also In re Adoption of Doe,
supra note 106, at 37.

See note 108. supra.
See UTAHCODEANN $ 76-7-204 (1989); MICII.COMP.LAWS55722.851 through 722.863 (1988); D.C.
CODEANN.$5 16-40 1 and 16-402 ( 1993); A m . REV. STAT'.$25-2 I8 ( 1989); N.D. CENT.COI)L:$5 14- 18- 1
through 14- 18-7 (1 989); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW$ 5 12 1 through 124 (McKinney 1993); WASII. REV. CODI
§$26.26.210 through 26.26.260 (1 989); IND. CODE$53 1-20-1 - 1 through 3 1-20- 1-3 ( 1989); K Y . REV.
Io9

'I0

addition, there is one uniform law which provides for an option of voiding surrogacy
contracts."' Although the purpose of these laws is the same, the statutory approaches
vary. Accordingly, the potential outcomes can be markedly different when each of these
statutes is applied.
In order to compare the effectiveness of these statutes I have analyzed each of
them with respect to the following four areas: (1) whether they apply to both paid and
unpaid surrogacy arrangements; (2) whether they provide for civil or criminal penalties;

(3) whether and how they address disputes regarding parental rights; and (4) whether they
apply to gestational surrogacy contracts. I then rated each of the statutes with respect to
the amount of clarity and guidance each of them give to the courts and citizens regarding
the status of surrogacy contracts within the jt~isdiction."~In this section I will briefly
discuss why each of the areas of evaluation is important and how I rated statutes within
this area. I will then discuss some of the reoccurring problems within these statutes
which should be addressed within any statute promulgated by New Mexico.
Within the four areas of evaluation the primary inquiry was whether the statute
was clear and consistent enough to promote the dignity and equality of the individuals
involved while providing for certainty of outcome to those who are contemplating such

an arrangement. In each category one point was given for a statute which met these goals
but one point was subtracted for a statute which failed to meet these goals.''' While this

STAT.ANN. $ 5 199.590 and 199.990 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); NEB. REV. SI'AT.$25-2 1,200 (1988); and LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. $27 13 (West 1987).
" I U N I F .STAI-US
OF ClllLDRM OF ASSISTED CONCEPTIONACT $$ 1 and S(a1ternative B) (1988).
The full text of my examination can be found in appendix 1 of this article.
"' The resulting scores range from four points (for a statute which scored a point in each category) to
negative four points (for a statute which lost a point it1 each category).

methodology is not scientific, it does provide a way of measuring the relative strength of
each statute and its ability to effect a certain yet equitable outcome.
A. Application to Paid and Unpaid Contracts.
Even surrogacy contracts which are entered into for non-monetary motivations
present the problem that the surrogate may seek to renege on her agreement and keep the
child. In this situation, the courts will be faced with the problem of whether to uphold the
contract. Accordingly, the state may be required to become a reluctant participant in thc
aftermath whether or not the contract was for pecuniary gain.''' Therefore, the first and
most basic point of any statute to void surrogacy contracts is that it address both paid and
unpaid contracts in order to provide clarity and certainty in
Several states have enacted legislation prohibiting only paid surrogacy
~ontracts."~
While these statutes do offer some protection to the women and children
involved in surrogacy contracts, their lack of application in many contexts may ultin~ately
lead to more problems than they solve.
For example, in Washington surrogacy contracts which are entered into for
compensation are void."' However, the statute exempts from its provisions "payment sf
expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy and the actual medical expenses of a
surrogate mother and the payment of reasonable attorney fees for thc drafting of thc

-

-- -

- -

-

-

'

l4 See Keith J . Hey, Assisfed Concep~ion
and Surrogacy - Un/inishcd Busines.~,26 J. M AKSI 1~1.1-L. R E V .
775, 809 ( 1 993).
' I 5 When I was evaluating state statutes in this category I gave them one point if they provided for
application to paid and unpaid contracts and subtracted one point if they did not.
' I h See WASH.R E V . CODE§§26.26.210 through 26.26.260 (1989); KY. R E V . STAT. ANN. 5s 199.590 and
199.990 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. $ 25-2 1,200 ( I 988); LA. R I ~ v . S'I'AI. ANN. 9 27 13 ( W e s t

1987).
See WASI-I. REV. CODE 526.26.240 ( 1989).
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surrogate parentage ° on tract.""^ This language indicates that many s m g a c y agreements
would be exempt from the voiding provisions of the Washington law since many are
designed primarily to reimburse the surrogate for the expenses and troubles of
pregnancy.

l9

The question of what happens when a dispute involving unpaid contracts comes
before the Washington courts remains. Two contradictory answers to this question
emerge fiom an analysis of Washington law. First, is the general principle of statutory
construction that laws specifically applying to one type of behavior while logically
(although not explicitly) excluding another type of behavior should not apply to the
excluded behavior.I2O This would seem to indicate that surrogacy contracts which are not
entered into for compensation would not be void in Washington since the legislature
chose not to include them in its prohibitory legislation.
However, during the same year that this statute was enacted, the Attorney General
of Washington wrote an opinion that "[a] surrogate parenting agreement is not
enforceable if the surrogate withdraws her consent to relinquish her ~ h i l d . " ' ~This
'
seems
to indicate that even a non-paid surrogacy agreement may be void in Washington.
The statutes which have voided both paid and unpaid surrogacy contracts have
avoided this uncertainty. Their application to all surrogacy contracts gives those who
wish to enter into surrogacy agreements notice that their agreements will never be
binding. The statutes which void surrogacy contracts protect the liberty interests of the

'I8
"'I

O''
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See WASII. REV.CODE$26.26.2 10 ( 1989).
See York, supra note 63, at 398.
See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991).
See Opinion of the Attorney General, WASI I. OP. A n ' Y GEN. I989 No. 4

surrogate mother by allowing her full decisional capacity until and unless she chooses to
give her child up to another family. However, when only paid surrogacy contracts are
void, the liberty of the surrogate is ambiguous. The tempestuous twenty five years of
abortion law has taught us that "[lliberty finds no refuge in ajurispmdence of doubt."'"

B. Imposition of Civil or Criminal Penalties.
As discussed before, the primary arguments for the crin~inalizationof contracts
for surrogate motherhood are based on the same policies that have resulted in the
criminalization of "baby-selling" and slavery, nanlely that the dignity of all human beings
precludes treatment of a human as an article of commerce. Accordingly, it would be
inconsistent for a state to take the position that the exchange of money for children in a
surrogacy context is offensive enough to warrant the invalidation of such contracts on
public policy grounds while not providing penalties for that samc conduct. 'This is
especially so where the state has criminalized the exchange of children and adults for
money through anti "baby-selling" statutcs and slaverylpeonage prohibitions.I2'
Despite the inconsistency of such positions, several states have declared surrogacy
contracts to be void while not providing penalties for those who endcavor to purchase a
child through s u r r ~ g a c ~However,
.'~~
most of these states prohibit the sale of children in

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
When I was evaluating state statutes in this category I gave them one point if they provided for penalties
for surrogacy contracts which involved monetary gain and subtracted one point if they did not. tiowever,
statutes which allowed for the payment of medical expenses only were not penalized since most states
allow the same in an adoption context.
See ARIZ. REV.STAT.$25-2 1 8 ( 1989); N.D. C w r . CODI: $5 14- 18- 1 through 14- 18-7 (1 989); IND.
CODE$53 1-20- 1 - 1 through 3 1-20- 1-3 (1 988); NED. REV.SrKr. $25-2 1,200 (1 988); and LA. Rrv. STAT.
ANN. $27 13 (West 1987).
12'

an adoption context and provide penalties for those who try to engage in such a~tivity.'~'
This inconsistency is bound to lead to difficulties in the application of such laws.
For example, the state may seek to prosecute those who engage in paid surrogacy
arrangements under the adoption statutes. The state would argue that the paid surrogacy
agreement fits within the class of activity prohibited by the adoption statute. However,
the defendant would argue that since the legislature chose not to provide criminal
penalties for paid surrogacy contracts, it did not intend for such arrangements to be
punishable despite their similarity to paid adoptions. This argument would be consistent
with the established Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the failure of a legislature to
act in a context similar to one in which they have chosen to act previously.'26
Accordingly, states which act to void surrogacy contracts should specifically
indicate that any paid surrogacy arrangements are sub.ject to criminal penalties. Failure to
do so could have the absurd result of creating an anti-s~~rrogacy
statute which actually
reduces the potential jeopardy of those who choose to engage in paid surrogacy by
negating their exposure to the prohibitions of anti "baby-selling" statutes.

C. Determination of Parental Rights
The past litigation surrounding surrogacy contracts has almost exclusively
involved disputes over who should have parental rights to the child.I2' A statute which
voids surrogacy contracts without providing an answer to questions of parentage would
create far more questions than it solves by invalidating the pre-existing agreement

I2'See A R E . REV. STAT. 58- I 14 (1989); N.D.CENT.CODE$ 12.1-3 1-05 (1989); IND. CODE$35-46- 1-9
( 1 988); and LA. STAT. ANN.-R.S.$ 14:286 ( 1987).
See Gozlon-Peretz supra note 120, at 404.
'" See In r e Baby M , supra note 23; see also Buzzanca, supru note 3.

regarding parentage without providing any alternative methods of establishing
parentage."'

Any statute which voids surrogacy contracts should therefore provide at

least a default position which would attempt to resolve parentage conflicts before they
become an issue. The statutory default position reflected in most parentage statutes
would be the gestational and birth mother as the mother and her husband (if she is
married) as the father.Iz9
The current statutes which void surrogacy contracts seem to fit into one of three
categories with respect to resolving issues of parentage. Three states provide concrete
guidance which establishes that the surrogate is the mother and her husband (if she is
married) is the father.I3O The second category includes three states who provide that the
court shall conduct a "best interests" analysis in order to determine the parentage of the
child.I3' Finally, seven states provide no meaningful guidance which coui-ts can use to
resolve parentage issues."*
When enacting a statute which voids surrogacy contracts, states should recognize
that such statutes will almost invariably have the effect of creating conflicting claims of
parentage. In order to avoid unnecessary litigation a statute should provide concrete
guidance regarding presumptions of parentage. The legislature has three potential
choices as parents. First, it could choose to create a presumption in favor of the surrogate
-

-

12' When I was evaluating state statutes in this category I gave them one point if they providcd for clear
statutory default rules regarding parentage and subtracted one point if they did not.
See UNIFORM
PARENTAGE
ACT, $6 3 & 4.
'I0 See UTAI-I
CODEA N N . $76-7-204 (1 989); ARIZ. REV. STAT.$25-2 18; and N.D.CENT.CODE5 14- 18-05
(I 989).
"'See MICII.COMP.LAWS 4722.861 (1988); W A S ~ IR. E V . CODE$26.26.260 (1989); IND.COLIE$3 1-20-13 ( 1 988).

and her husband (if she is married). This would be consistent with other areas of family
law which presume the birth mother and her husband to be parents of the child.'33
Second, it could presume that the couple who contracted for the child are the parents.
This choice would be inconsistent with the purposes of the statute voiding the contract
however because it would have the effect of enforcing the sLurogacy arrangement as
against the surrogate mother. The final choice would be to presume that the biological
parents (providers of the gametes) are the parents. This would be very difficult (if not
impossible) given that the gametes are often obtained from anonymous donors through
sperm and ova depositories.
Accordingly, the only logically and legally consistent way for the legislature to
provide concrete guidance, and therefore certainty, in the law of surrogate relationsl~ipsis
to provide a parentage presumption in favor of the surrogate and her h ~ s b a n d . " ~

D. Statutory Application to Gestational Agreements
Until very recently, few would have considered the possibility that a child could
have six potential parents. However, the B u z ~ a n c acase
' ~ ~ has made it clear that those
who are drafting statutes which are to apply in surrogacy contexts should draft their
statutes broadly enough to cover all potential surrogacy situations, yet clearly enough to

"*

See D.C. C O D E$5 16-401 and 16-402 (1993); N.Y. DOM.REL,.LAW $$I21 through 124 (McKinncy
1993); KY. REV. STAT.ANN.$$199.590 and 199.990 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); NljrI. Rlrv. S"l.~.r.$25-2 1,200
( 1988); and LA. REV. STAT.ANN. $27 14 (West 1987).
" ' S e e UNIFORM
PARENTAGEACT, $ 5 3 & 4.
'I' Recent caselaw in Arizona has demonstrated the need to be consistent in the framing of a parentage
statute. In Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) the Arizona Court of Appeals
struck down the Arizona surrogacy statute on the grounds that it violated the equal protection clause of the
Arizona Constitution since it allowed the biological father to rebut the presumption that the surrogate's
husband was the father but it did not provide the biological mother the same opportunity.
"' Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rpt.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).

provide meaningfd guidance.'36 A statute voiding surrogacy contracts should therefore
apply to gestational as well as traditional susrogacy contracts.
Only two state statutes explicitly apply to gestational'" surrogacy
Several state statutes seem to apply to gestational contracts but not

contract^."^
Three

statutes either do not apply to gestational contracts or are so ambiguous that they are
unlikely to apply.'40
Any statute which voids surrogacy contracts should apply to all surrogacy
contracts unless there is a valid reason for it to exempt certain classes of contracts. It
does not appear that the statutes that do not apply to gestational contracts have exempted
them intentionally. Rather, it is likely that such surrogacy arrangements were simply not
contemplated at the time these statutes were enacted. Accordingly, new state statutes
should be carefully drafted in order to include all foresceable surrogacy situations.
IV. PROPOSED NEW MEXICO SURROGATE PARENTAGE ACT

In order to address the problems of surrogacy discussed above, New Mexico should
enact legislation which will: (1) void all surrogacy contracts; (2) provide penalties for
those who engage in paid surrogacy arrangements; and (3) settle questions of parentage
which may arise when a surrogacy arrangement is invalidated. In this portion of the

"6 When I was evaluating state statutes in this category I gave them one point if they provided for
application to gestational surrogacy contracts and subtracted one point if they did not.
13' Surrogacy arrangements by which the resulting child is not necessarily genetically related to either the
surrogate couple or the contracting couple.
See MICH. COMP.LAWS 5722.853 (1988); and WASII. REV.CODE$26.26.2 10 (1 989).
'I9 See UTAH
CODEANN 576-7-204 (1 989); D.C. CODEANN. 9 16-40 1 ( I 993); ARM. REV.S'TA'I'.$25-2 I8
(1989); N.D. CENT.CODE$4 14-18- 1 and 14-18-5 (1 989); N.Y.
DOM. RI:L. LAW$ I2 I (McKinney 1993);
IND. CODE$53 1-20- I - I through 3 1-20- 1-3 (1 989).
'" See KY. REV.STAT.ANN. 4 199.590 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); N E D .RI:v. STAT. $25-2 1,200 ( 1988); and
LA. REV. STAT.ANN. $27 13 (West 1987).

paper I will first propose a New Mexico Surrogate Parentage Act. Then I will analyze the
act with respect to how it would apply in a general context.

A. Proposed New Mexico Surrogate Parentage Act
Below is a proposal for a New Mexico Surrogate Parentage Act. Much of its
language is drawn from other statutes which have addressed surrogacy effectively.
Where language has been used which is the same or substantially similar to a particular
statute, the statute is cited in appropriate footnotes.

Section 1 :

definition^'^'

(a) "Compensation" - means a payment of money, objects, services, or anything
of value except payment of expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy and
the actual medical expenses of a surrogate mother.
(b) "Participating Party" - means a surrogate mother, spouse of a surrogate
mother, or the parties intended by the surrogate parentage contract to be the
mother and father of the resulting child.
(c) "Surrogate Gestation" - means the implantation in a female of an embryo not
genetically related to that female and subsequent gestation of a child by that
female.
(d) "Surrogate Mother" - means a female who is naturally or artificially

inseminated or undertakes surrogate gestation and who subsequently gestates
a child conceived through the insemination pursuant to a surrogate parentage
contract.

(e) "Surrogate Parentage Contract" - means a contract, agreement, or
arrangement, whether written or unwritten, in which a female agrees to
conceive a child through natural insemination, artificial insemination, or
surrogate gestation and to voluntarily relinquish her parental or custodial
rights to the child.
Section 2:

Prohibitions"*

(a) A surrogate parentage contract, whether executed in the State of New Mexico
or in another jurisdiction, shall be void and unenforceable in the State of New
Mexico as contrary to public policy.
(b) No participating party, person, organization, or agency shall enter into, induce,
arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage
contract, written or unwritten, for compensation.
Section 3:

penal tie^''^

(a) Any participating party who enters into, induces, arranges, procures, or
otherwise assists in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract, written or
unwritten, for compensation shall be subject to the payment of a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(b) Any person, organization, or agency other than a participating party, which
enters into, induces, arranges, procures, or otherwise assists in the formation
of a surrogate parentage contract, written or unwritten, for compensation shall

The definitions section is largely drawn from MICH.COMP.LAWS $722.853 (1 988).
The prohibitions section is drawn primarily from WASII.
REV. CODE§§26.26.230,and 26.26.240
( 1989).
''I
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be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to imprisonnle~ltin the county jail for
a definite tern of less than one year or to the payment of a fine of not more
than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or to both.
Section 4:

ParentageiJ4

(a) The surrogate is the mother of a resulting child and the surrogate's husband is
the father of the child. If the surrogate is unmarried, paternity of the child is
governed by the Uniform Parentage Act (N.M. Stat. Ann. $940- 1 1- 1 through
40- 1 1-23 (1 978)).

B. Application
Under the New Mexico Surrogate Parentage Act there would be uniformity of
treatment among all types of surrogacy arrangements whether they are gestational 01.
traditi~nal.'~'In either situation, the contract would be void and the surrogate mother and
her husband would be presumed to be the parents of the resulting child.'46 If the surrogate
was unmarried, the paternity of the child would be determined according to the provisions
of the New Mexico Uniform Parentage ,4ct.'17

14' The penalties section is drawn from the prohibition language of WASll. REV.CODE526.26.230 (1989)
and N.Y. DOM.REL. LAW § 123 (McKinney 1993). The penalties for third parties providing prohibited
payments are the same as they are in connection with adoptions under N.M. STAT. ANN.$32A-5-42.
"" This parentage section is drawn from the UNIF.STATUSOF CIIILDKEN
01: ASSISTED CONCEPTION
ACI'
$5(alternative B) (1988) with reference to the NEW MEXICO UNl1:ORM PARENTAGE
ACT (N.M. STAT. ANN.
$540-1 1-1 to 40-1 1-23 (1978)) for determination of the paternity of the child when paternity cannot be
determined by this section.
145
See supra Section I .
l a See supra Section 2(a) & Section 4.
1 4 ' N.M. STAT.A N N . 5540-1 1- 1 to 40-1 1-23 (1 978).

The Surrogate Parentage Act would void both paid and unpaid

contract^.'^'

Where the arrangement is procured for compensation, the surrogate and her husband as
well as the proposed parents are subject to a civil fine.IJ9 Others who are involved in the
arrangement are exposed to criminal liability just as they would be for making prohibited
payments in an adoption context.'50 However, payment under this act does not include
medical expenses or expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy."' This allows for
treatment consistent with adoption arrangements, where the tnother can be paid for
medical and living expenses.'s2

IV. CONCLUSION
Science and technology have provided great possibilities in the area of human
reproduction. However, they provide no guidance regarding the morality or legality of
the application of the techniques which they make p o s s i b l e . ' 5 ~ r o v i d i guidance
~~g
is the
province and the duty of the legislat~re."~
New Mexico must act to protect the dignity of
all its citizens by clearly establishing a policy of prohibiting all activities which result in
the commodification and sale of human beings no matter what form they take. In order to
act effectively in this area, New Mexico should adopt legislation which will: (1) void all
surrogacy contracts; (2) provide penalties for those who engage in paid surrogacy
arrangements; and (3) settle questions of parentage which may arise when a surrogacy
arrangement is invalidated.
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See supra Section 2(a).
See supra Section 3(a).
See supra Section 3(b).
See supra Section I ( a ) .
See N.M.STAT.A m . 932A-5-34B.
See Wagner, supra note 5 , at 133.

See John R. Dunne & Gregory V. Serio Surrogate Parenling Afler Baby M : The Ball Moves To The
Legislarure's Court 4 TOUR0 L. R E V . 16 1 ( 1 988).

Appendix I : Analysis of Laws Voiding Surrogacy Contracts
STATE
Utah
Utah Code
Ann. tj 76-7204 (1989).

Michigan

PAID &
UNPAID
Yes

CRJMlNAL OR ClVIL
PENALTIES
Yes. Individuals who are
involved in a paid surrogacy
contract are guilty of a Class B
Misdemeanor.

Yes

Yes.
a) Involvement in a contract
where the surrogate is a
minor or has other
infirmities = Felony: 5
years/ $50,000.
b) Involvement in a contract
for compensation =
Misdemeanor: I year/
$50,000.
c) Arranging a contract for
compensation = Felony: 5
years1 $50,000.
Yes. If the arrangement is for
compensation there can be a
civil penalty of $10,000 and I
year imprisonment.

Mich.Comp.
Laws $5
722.85 1
through
722.863

Wash. D.C.

Yes.

D.C. Code
Ann. $4 1640 1 and 16402 (1 993).
Arizona

Yes

No

Yes

No

Ariz. Rev.
Stat. 25218 (1989)

North
Dakota

N.D. Cent.
Code $5 14I 8- 1 through
14-18-7
( 1 989).

PARENTAGE
Yes.
Surrogate =
Mother
Husband =
Father
Plus the statute
provides for a
'best interests
analysis'
No, except that
it provides for
an application
of the best
interests test.

GESTATIONAL
CONTRACTS
Yes, but not
explicitly.

SCORE
+4

Yes, this statute
explicitly applies
to gestational
conlracts.

+2

No.

Yes, but not
explicitly.

+2

Surrogate =
Mother
I-iusband =
Father
However, the
presumption
that the husband
is the father is
rebuttable.
Yes.
Surrogate =
Mother
Husband =
Father unless
the husband is
not a party to
the contract.

Yes, but not
explicitly.

+2

Yes, but not
explicitly.
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Appendix I : Analysis of h v s Voiding Surrogaq~Contracts
STATE
Uniform
Law.
Unif. Status
of Children
of Assisted
Conception
Act $4 I and
5(alternative
B) (1 988).
New York

PAID &
UNPAID
Yes.

CRIMINAL OR C I V I L
PENALTIES
No.

Yes

N.Y. Dom.
Rel. Law $4
I2 1 through
124
(McKinney
1993).

-

GESTATIONAL

SCORE

CONTRACTS
Surrogate =
Mother
Husband =
Father unless
the husband is
not a party to
the agreement.

Yes, but not
explicitly.

+2

Yes. If compensation is given
beyond medical expenses the
following penalties apply:
a) For parties: $500 civil
penalty.
b) For those who arrange the
contract: $10,000 civil
penalty for the first offense
and a Felony for the
second offense.
Yes. Involvement in a
surrogacy contract which
involves payment outside of
allowed expenses is a Gross
Misdemeanor.

No, except that
the statute
provides that
the contract
may not be
considered as
being adverse to
the interests of
the surrogate.

Yes, but not
explicitly.

-t2

No. Except for
a 'best interests
analysis'.

Yes, explicitly
applies to
gestational
contracts.

0

No, except that
it states that the
contract is not
to be considered
in a 'bcst
interests'
analysis.
No.

Yes, but not
explicitly.

0

Unknown.

-3

No. The only
provision
indicates that
the biological
father shall be
the father.

No.

-4

Wash.
Wash. Rev.
Code $8
26.26.2 10
through
26.26.260
(1989).
Indiunu
Ind. Code $5
31-20-1-1
through 3 1 20- 1-3

No, only
applies to
paid
contracts.

Yes

No

Kentucky

No, only
applies to
paid
contracts.

Yes, Involvement in a paid
surrogacy contract is a
Misdemeanor with a penalty of
6 months/ $2000.

Ky. Rev.
Stat' Ann' "
199.590 and
199.990
(BanksBaldwin
1994)
No, only
Nebraska
applies to
Neb. Rev.
paid
Stat. 25contracts.
2 1,200
(I 988).

PARENTAGE

No

Appendix 1 :Analysis oJ Laws Voiding Surrogacy Contracts
STATE
Louisiana

'

La. Rev.
Stat. Ann.
27 13 (West
1987).

CRIMINALORCIVIL
PAID&
UNPAID PENALTIES
No, only No
applies to
paid
contracts.

PARENTAGE
No.

GESTATIONAL
CON TRACTS
No.

SCORE
-4

